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Abstract: Global Framework Agreements (GFAs) are still a marginal topic 
in political and academic discourses over global governance and corporate 
responsibility. In functional terms, GFAs are a commitment to include global 
labor standards with respect to human resource management as part of this 
broader turn to CR. But to what extent are these intentions and goals actually 
realized? Are corporations able and willing to implement GFAs in a joint effort 
together with the unions across a vastly diverse range of institutional settings 
and national arrangements? And do GFAs have an influence on core elements 
of a company’s business policy decisions? Drawing on the insights from an 
interdisciplinary and multinational project, this paper uses four case studies 
to explore the conditions and variations in GFA implementation in the USA. 
Although we observe, as have others before us, that key matters of business 
strategy such as investments, acquisitions, restructuring, or relocation are 
more centralized than corporate policies on labor relations, we provide some 
evidence that the implementation of GFAs can be moved forward by a conflu-
ence of external actor involvement and of corporate strategies motivated by a 
desire to streamline HRM practices (that include the goals covered by GFAs in 
their core business practices). This finding of the influence of external actor 
voice in implementation processes may also have broader explanatory power 
with respect to CR initiatives in general. And in theoretical terms it allows us to 
explore the interplay between macro structural explanations like the Varieties 
of Capitalism approach, and the strategic “micro-political” explanations. Our 
study, in fact, suggests a strong need to combine these in a more systematic 
fashion.
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1 Although the term “International Framework Agreements” is still more widely used, we have 
opted for “Global Framework Agreements” because this term has recently become the most 
recognized designation among the GUFs.
2 According to the UNI website, the ILO calculates that direct and indirect employment by 
MNCs is over 90 million people, a relatively small (ca. 5%) but strategically significant portion 
of the global workforce. http://www.uniglobalunion.org/Apps/iportal.nsf/pages/20090226_
ml9xEn.
3 Gartenberg and Bandekar 2011.
4 Davies et al. 2011.
5 Fichter and Helfen 2011.
6 Levy and Prakash 2003.
Markus Helfen: Department of Management, School of Business and Economics,  
Free University Berlin, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195 Berlin, Germany
1  Introduction
Global Framework Agreements1 (GFAs) are still a marginal topic in political 
and academic discourses over global governance and corporate responsibility. 
But since the 1990s, Global Union Federations (GUFs), the international bodies 
of national sectoral unions, have negotiated more than 80 such agreements 
with multinational corporations.2 These are mostly companies headquartered 
in Europe. Among them are such global players as Daimler, Bosch, EDF, GDF 
Suez, G4S, Securitas, ISS, Carrefour, and Telefonica. All are corporations 
with high-profile corporate responsibility programs and a pro-active policy 
of internationalizing their operations. In broad terms, then, GFAs are indica-
tive of corporate leadership’s acceptance of global labor policy as an element 
of Corporate Responsibility (CR) and of labor unions as legitimate actors in 
implementing this policy throughout the corporation and its global production 
networks.
But to what extent are these intentions and goals actually realized? Are 
corporations – along with their labor partners – able and willing to imple-
ment GFAs across a vastly diverse range of institutional settings and national 
arrangements? The emerging research literature suggests that there are serious 
problems of implementation, not only in less industrialized countries such as 
India3 or Ukraine,4 but also in the USA,5 as one of the dominant powers in the 
world political economy. However, taking the USA as an example, we also find 
exceptions to the prevailing pattern of non-implementation which create an 
interesting puzzle. To explore this puzzle we use the bargaining model over gov-
ernance regimes advanced by Levy and Prakash,6 which situates multinational 
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7 One term that may engender some confusion here is “local”. In the literature the term is 
sometimes used to refer to the national and sometimes to the subnational levels. We use it 
here to cover both levels and insert national or subnational as necessary to ensure clarity. Such 
an effort is justified by the fact that national and subnational actors and institutions are often 
important players in our cases and in the transfer of practices, more generally.
8 Deeg and Jackson 2007.
9 Jonas 1996; see also Brown et al. 2010.
corporations in a web of negotiations with multiple actors and at various levels. 
By focusing on the role of global and local actors, both internal and external 
to the MNC, we offer an explanation for the variety of outcomes in furthering 
new governance arrangements and opening paths of institutional formation and 
change in labor relations. While we endeavor to recognize the impacts of all the 
relevant actors involved, the thrust of our argument will be on whether and how 
transnational union collaboration leverages global management commitment to 
CR, expressed in the GFA, to promote local GFA implementation. In functional 
terms, then, this article sheds new light on the labor relations of MNCs, offering 
a different perspective on the internationalization of human resource manage-
ment and the transfer of practices from HQs to subsidiaries. In broader terms it 
explores the role of agency and brings in the local7 level in the shaping of global 
governance.
The paper begins by introducing GFAs. In addition to clarifying their origins 
we pay close attention to their potential impacts on the organization and policies 
of MNCs and their global production networks. However, as the emerging empiri-
cal literature recognizes there are serious implementation deficits. In the third 
part we turn to a concise review of the most plausible theoretical explanations 
rooted in the comparative capitalism literature.8 While these macro institutional 
approaches may help us to understand broad patterns of corporate adaptation to 
local settings in the USA, they fail to explain variations which more recent empiri-
cal studies of GFA implementation in the USA have documented. To understand 
these deviations from the general or presumed pattern of MNC labor relations 
we draw on the bargaining model proposed by Levy and Prakash. This model 
allows us to link the transnational processes and dynamics of GFA negotiations 
to the practices of implementation at workplaces within particular local labor 
control regimes (LLCR). Through this linkage we are able to focus attention on the 
micro-politics of how actors operate within such local institutional settings while 
being open to understanding the impacts of transnational processes and dynam-
ics. In particular, we explore how demands and strategies from headquarter-level 
actors, both internal and external to the MNC, shape such regimes to effect the 
fuller implementation of GFAs.9 Part four of our presentation uses the structure 
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10 For more details, see Papadakis 2011.
11 BWI: Building and Woodworkers’ International; ICEM: International Federation of Chemical, 
Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions; IMF: International Metalworkers’ Federation; UNI: 
UNI Global Union. In June 2012, ICEM and IMF merged with the textile workers’ union (IGTLWF) 
to form the new manufacturing GUF under the name of IndustriALL.
12 Preuss et al. 2009; Stevis 2010.
13 Waddock 2008.
14 Fransen and Kolk 2007.
15 Stevis and Boswell 2008: pp. 117–124.
of the theoretical arguments to present our four case studies, revealing both simi-
larities and important variations. In part five we consider the lessons that we 
derive from these cases and point to the kinds of transnational micro-politics to 
which our study contributes. In the final section, we draw a number of conclu-
sions related to the themes of this special issue.
2  Overview and significance of GFAs
2.1  What are GFAs? 
In formal terms GFAs are agreements between multinationals and Global Union 
Federations. The first GFA was negotiated in 1988 but it took another decade 
for the initiative to pick up steam. Starting in 2000 there was an acceleration of 
agreements. By the end of April 2012, 85 GFAs were operative.10 Over 90% of them 
have been signed by one of four GUFs (BWI, ICEM, IMF, UNI).11 As for the signa-
tory corporations, 85% are headquartered in Europe, attesting to a European style 
of HRM policies and labor relations at the HQ level.12
Unlike unilateral Codes of Conduct13 or multi-stakeholder arrangements,14 
GFAs are negotiated between corporate headquarters and representatives of 
organized labor. Although labor may be represented primarily by an internal 
employee representative body such as a European Works Council, or by a home 
country labor union at the negotiation table, the mark of a GFA is its signing by 
a Global Union Federation (GUF). In fact, one major reason why GFAs are practi-
cally and theoretically intriguing is that in agreeing to negotiate in good faith, 
MNCs extend “recognition” to GUFs as the legitimate representative of unions 
at the transnational level. GFAs are thus a reversal of MNC’s historical refusal to 
negotiate with labor unions beyond the nation-state.15 Labor’s willingness, and 
indeed, its need to negotiate with MNCs at a transnational level is arguably an 
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16 Logue 1980; Hyman 2004.
17 Fichter et al. 2011a.
18 The core labor standards refer to the prohibition of child labor (ILO co. 138 and 182) and 
forced labor (ILO co. 29 and 105), to non-discrimination and equal pay (ILO co. 100 and 111), and 
to freedom of association and collective bargaining (ILO co. 87 and 98).
19 Fichter et al.  2011b.
20 cf. Campbell 2007; Matten and Moon 2008; Griffin and Prakash 2010.
important addition to its historically conditioned embeddedness in national (and 
in the case of the EU, regional) systems of labor relations16 as well as an option for 
more collaborative global industrial relations.
As a joint labor – management statement of policy, a GFA is based on 
minimum labor standards and negotiated procedures. Although several GUFs 
have published model framework agreements, these have not become a recog-
nized standard for all GFAs. Nevertheless, while each agreement embodies a 
corporation-specific outcome of negotiations,17 the core labor standards18 estab-
lished by the International Labor Organization’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work are the bottom line of all GFAs. Of the four core 
labor standards of the ILO, freedom of association and the right to collective bar-
gaining have proven to be the most contentious issues.19
The broader goal of GFAs is not global collective bargaining but, rather, 
global social dialogue. However, the intent of this dialogue is to encourage and 
facilitate unionization and collective bargaining at MNC subsidiaries (and to a 
limited extent at suppliers). Since collective bargaining outcomes are legally 
binding, they can create or modify national institutions and practices of labor 
relations and, by extension, the GFA itself. GFAs thus overcome the rather epi-
sodic nature of most consumer campaigns and the arbitrariness of unilateral 
codes of conduct. In their design they are at the interface of HRM and IR with the 
potential of modifying the boundaries of both of these concepts and practices 
and, more broadly, of CR.
While all of the MNC signatories to GFAs have well-designed and published 
CR programs, this alone does not provide an explanation as to why they have 
consented to negotiate and sign such an agreement. Far more MNCs have CR pro-
grams than have signed a GFA. However, research has pointed to institutional and 
strategic factors that are the source of wide-ranging differences in actual CR prac-
tices.20 And as has been observed in regard to GFA negotiations, the spectrum of 
CR policies may range from a highly voluntaristic and instrumental approach, “in 
which commitment to CSR, including labor-related measures, is primarily aimed 
at risk reduction and issue management,” to more sophisticated approaches in 
which a commitment to uphold labor standards is seen as being part and parcel 
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21 Fichter et al. 2011a: p. 612; Stevis 2009: pp. 4–5.
22 Stevis and Boswell 2007, pp. 176–181; Egels-Zandén 2009.
23 Macaire 2001.
24 Hoffman 2008.
25 IOE 2007; ITC-ILO 2010.
26 E.g., Herrnstadt 2007.
27 Stevis and Boswell 2007: pp. 176–181.
28 Stevis and Boswell 2008: pp. 117–124; Northrup and Rowan 1979.
of the company’s business strategy and model.21 Further motives may be asso-
ciated with the institutional and organizational strength of organized labor in 
the home country,22 with an interest in internationalizing and standardizing HRM 
practices throughout TNC operations, with public accountability requirements,23 
or even in a few cases, as a result of confrontations, such as global or national 
campaigns.24
To be sure, any number of prominent MNCs have not signed a GFA although 
they match these criteria. Whether there is a distinguishable pattern of accept-
ance or rejection is a research question in need of closer attention. The relevant 
point for our paper is that the signing of a GFA is not a routine decision by CR 
minded corporations, despite the fact that some of the signatories see it as part 
of their CR strategy. It is an important decision that most corporations do not 
take lightly, and their reasons for negotiating agreements vary a great deal and 
can also shift over time. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of business 
associations, think tanks and law firms have advised against signing GFAs as if 
they were a typical kind of CR.25
Attitudes towards GFAs also vary among unions. For many local unions and 
national affiliates of the GUFs, especially outside of Europe, the purpose and use-
fulness of GFAs is not self-evident.26 A number of national unions are skeptical 
of the wisdom of pursuing recognition rather than more concrete commitments. 
On the other hand, home unions and employee representatives see GFAs as an 
extension of national and European industrial relations and a way to monitor 
the increasingly internationalizing MNCs.27 But for the GUFs, framework agree-
ments have become a policy tool for agenda setting and carving a niche in global 
labor governance for themselves above and beyond the priorities of the dominant 
affiliates. Whereas their earlier attempts during the late 1960s and 1970s, which 
sought transnational collective bargaining and targeted primarily US companies, 
failed,28 their new approach around GFAs has sought social dialogue at more 
amenable European companies. Recognition as a legitimate bargaining repre-
sentative regar ding labor issues has been of prime importance for GUFs, a prior-
ity that can be seen as a contributing factor to accepting some agreements with 
weaker language.
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29 Helfen, M. and J. Sydow. 2013. “Negotiating as Institutional Work: The Case of Labor Stand-
ards and International Framework Agreements.” Organization Studies 34 (in print).
30 Descolonges 2009; cf. Davies et al. 2011; Fichter and Helfen 2011; Gartenberg and 
Bandekar 2011; Gregoratti and Miller 2011; McCallum 2011; Niforou 2011; Riisgaard and  
Hammer 2011; Robinson 2011.
31 Pudelko and Harzing 2007.
32 Cooke 2003: p. 69; see also Cooke 2001.
2.2  Implementation of GFAs 
Given the variety of reasons why companies and unions have signed GFAs it is not 
surprising that they are not all the same. Our analysis of the agreements resulting 
from the negotiation phase of the GFA process29 suggests three general categories. 
“Hollow” agreements are superficial in their implementation provisions as they 
do not set up strong mechanisms and, quite often, are vague about their goals. 
Moreover, management has done little to fulfill its implementation responsibilities. 
“Modifying” agreements tack implementation and monitoring tasks onto existing 
institutionalized labor-management relations at headquarters, extending the scope 
of activity of such bodies as European Works Councils or national Works Councils 
beyond their legal mandate. While in practice that may expand their position of 
influence vis-à-vis management, this concentration of GFA activity at headquarters 
can be detrimental to building actor capacity at other levels of the MNC and across 
the global production network. Finally, “creative” GFAs seek to establish new organ-
izational arrangements that reflect the global scale and scope of these agreements.
Beyond the implementation procedures anchored in the GFAs, local institu-
tional settings and local actors are key factors in the implementation process. 
Recent empirical studies, in fact, have pointed to the difficulties of implementing 
GFAs at the local level. In addition to local management’s ignorance or opposi-
tion and global management’s inactivity, a third key factor has been the paucity 
of cross-border union initiatives on behalf of activating the implementation 
and monitoring processes. Generally, local and global unions are challenged to 
develop their associational power, overcome institutional and legal deficits, and 
collaborate across borders.30
These insights are very relevant to the implementation of GFAs in the USA. The 
USA and NAFTA are prime investment targets for companies all over the world, 
but especially for those headquartered in Europe. Well before GFAs became a 
realistic prospect, research on European TNC policies in the USA found that these 
companies were prone to adopt host country practices that were considered to 
be advantageous31 such as “avoiding union representation or circumventing col-
lective bargaining altogether.”32 These findings are borne out by other empirical 
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33 Human Rights Watch 2010; Fichter 2011; Stevis 2011; Wills 2002.
34 Deeg and Jackson 2007; Lane and Wood 2009.
35 Hall and Soskice 2001.
36 E.g. Jackson and Deeg 2008; Streeck 2009; Almond 2011.
studies that include MNCs with GFAs.33 The common thread here is that Euro-
pean MNCs often depart from their collaborative labor relations policy at home 
and are willing to actively avoid union recognition and collective bargaining –  
despite having negotiated and signed global agreements championing such 
standards.
Yet, despite the generally problematic implementation trend there is also 
enough evidence of (successful) efforts to render local practices consistent 
with the GFA. As a result, a number of companies have brought their local 
labor relations policies into line with corporate policy to be consistent with 
their GFA. These include ArcelorMittal, Dannon, G4S, H&M, IKEA, Lafarge, 
Rhodia, SCA and Securitas. The dynamics of such changes are the core puzzle 
of this article.
3  Actors, bargaining, institution building
How can we account for both the initial pattern and the diversity of outcomes? 
While we recognize the significance of existing and different institutional ensem-
bles, we emphasize in particular the role of agency in the constitution, use and 
reconstitution of institutions.34 Evidence that European companies, whether they 
have signed GFAs or not, adapt their labor policies to the predominantly liberal 
capitalist approach in the US when investing there seems to be consistent with 
the comparative analyses of capitalism such as Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) or 
national business systems. In the VoC approach, for example, labor-management 
relations and collective bargaining arrangements are basic criteria for judging 
how firms interact with their institutional and social environment. In our context, 
we are dealing mostly with MNCs from continental Europe and Scandinavia, i.e., 
coordinated market economies, that have invested in the US, the hallmark of a 
liberal market economy.35
However, we would agree that comparative capitalism approaches overlook 
the institutional variability at the regional and local level within countries.36 
Furthermore, the role of agency is largely underplayed in such explanations, 
overlooking the possibility of local actors interpreting and shaping their insti-
tutional environment in dynamic ways – not the least in their bargains and 
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37 Thelen 2009.
38 Campbell, 2004; Geppert et al. 2006; Morgan and Kristensen 2006.
39 Geppert et al. 2006; Morgan and Kristensen 2006; Edwards et al. 2007.
40 Geppert and Williams 2006 are exceptional in this respect.
41 Walton et al. 2000.
42 Stevis and Boswell 2007.
negotiations with each other – even to the extent of changing macro-level insti-
tutions.37
A further criticism of the comparative capitalism line of research centers on 
its neglect of the influences from and the interactions with transnational and 
global forces. In response other discourses have given considerable attention to 
cross-border institutional change, i.e., local change that is triggered, influenced 
and sometimes forced upon local actors through connections to globally oper-
ating organizations.38 In particular, the approach which emphasizes the agency 
of micro-politics in cross-border institutional change is inextricably linked with 
the study of the institutional underpinnings of the MNC.39 In this literature, it 
is explicitly acknowledged that institutions are adopted, translated, enacted or 
dropped through agency in headquarter-subsidiary relationships; and political 
dynamics, conflict and contestation among groups internal and external to the 
organization are emphasized as driving forces for institutional change. And yet, 
although delivering important insights into the organizational context of negotia-
tions, these contributions not only bypass labor-management collective bargain-
ing and the internal-external nexus of labor unions, they also neglect negotia-
tions and their capacity to modify local interest positions and relax institutional 
constraints.40
The above insights are important to a fuller understanding of GFAs. As an 
emergent governance institution, GFAs are the subject of continuous bargaining – 
individually and collectively – both about their general goals and their specific 
provisions. Bargaining becomes even more complex during the implementa-
tion phase, as the mode becomes more “distributive”41 and the number of actors 
increases exponentially. While during the negotiation stage the participants are 
largely limited to central managers for the MNC and one of organized labor’s 
representative bodies (the GUF, one or more home country unions or a works 
council body), implementation adds similar actor constellations at subsidiaries 
(and suppliers) across the globe.42 All of these separate national and local settings 
are subject to complex institutional dynamics of their own. For that reason we 
suggest that a bargaining model as proposed by Levy and Prakash has consider-
able theoretical utility and is consistent with the admonition of various authors 
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43 Tempel and Walgenbach 2007; Lane and Wood 2009.
44 Levy and Prakash 2003: p. 133.
45 Levy and Prakash 2003: p. 147.
46 Jonas 1996: p. 325.
47 Riisgaard and Hammer 2011.
that the interplay between agency and institutions across borders be given closer 
attention.43
Levy and Prakash map out an argument for targeting MNCs as “key actors 
in the formation of governance regimes and that corporate strategies play an 
important role in the trajectory of regime development.”44 They suggest that the 
complexity and dynamic nature of bargaining processes, with multiple actors 
attempting to exert leverage through various sources of power, leads to some-
what indeterminate bargaining outcomes. Their approach to bargaining over 
governance institutions – structures in their terms – “recognizes the multi-
party nature of negotiations, multiple sources of power, and the complexity and 
dynamic nature of the bargaining process.”45 Levy and Prakash suggest that, at 
present, MNCs prefer global enabling regimes and local regulatory regimes. The 
deeper logic of their argument is that there is a strategic relationship between 
governance goals and location of authority. GFAs present an interesting test of 
this dynamic. While negotiated globally their implementation has to take place 
locally. This complicates the relationship between the goals of governance and 
the location of authority. While management prefers that agreements remain soft 
types of global CR, labor sees them as a prelude to local union recognition and 
bargaining and, thus, industrial relations.
Implementation brings the location of authority to the local level of sub-
sidiaries and suppliers in the host countries. An approach that can capture this 
dynamic is what geographers have labeled “local labor control regimes.” Jonas 
defines such “LLCRs” as a
historically contingent and territorially embedded set of mechanisms which coordinate the 
reciprocities between production, work, consumption and labor reproduction within a local 
labor market.46
Building on this understanding of a labor control regime in a local context, 
Riisgaard and Hammer47 conceptualize the injection of external conditions and 
actors via global production networks. Importantly, they emphasize the signifi-
cance of labor as an actor, to which Rainnie, Herod and McGrath-Champ have 
added, that the
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governance of inter-firm linkages is mediated by the specific social relations of local produc-
tion, as well as by the histories and geographical orientations of the actors involved (i.e., how 
local firms are spatially connected into the broader global economy). As a result, both produc-
tion and labor control regimes will vary enormously across space.48
3.1  Mapping institutions and agency
In order to better take advantage of any model that involves actors, institutions 
and bargaining at various levels it is necessary to map these elements. Drawing 
upon the analytical schemes offered by Brown et al.49 and Cooke50 we can map 
the agential and institutional parameters involved in the transfer of labor prac-
tices, thus giving more specificity to the bargaining model proposed by Levy and 
Prakash and the LLCR dynamics. These analytical schemes are essentially three-
dimensional. Institutions and actors, the first dimension, range from more inter-
nal to more external to the firm and operate from the global to the local levels (see 
Table 1 below).
External institutions relevant to labor practices involve corporate governance 
rules and industrial relations at the home and host countries as well as the com-
petitive landscape at all levels. One of the important factors that a number of 
authors have pointed to, and which we mentioned above, is the variability within 
Institutions Actors
External Corporate Governance (home and 
host)
IR and CR system(s) (home and host)
Competitive landscape (global, home 
and host)
Global (GUFs, home county unions, 
other national unions)
Local actors (national and subnational 
states and societal entities)
Local unions (national and subnational)
Internal Organization of firm (global, home 
and subsidiaries)
Culture of Firm (CR and GFAs)
Function and locale of activities
Global management
Global employee bodies
Local management (national and sub-
national)
Local unions and employee organiza-
tions (national and subnational) with 
contracts
Table 1: Parameters in the transfer of labor practices.
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51 Kostova 1999; Kostova and Roth 2002; Birkinshaw and Pedersen 2009; Almond 2011.
52 Crouch et al. 2009.
53 Kyle and Ruggie 2005.
54 Dicken 2011: pp. 121–122.
55 Cobb and Stueck 2005; Block and Keller 2011.
countries and across sectors. Global institutions and organizations are less rele-
vant with the ILO providing a shadow of regulatory standards and the ISO poised 
to do the same with respect to CR.
Internal institutional arrangements, including labor union participation in 
decision-making, are central to understanding the global-local nexus precisely 
because the organizations we are dealing with are multinational companies. Ana-
lysts have pointed to the power and behavior of subsidiaries, largely related to 
the mode of expansion (merger, acquisition, greenfield investment), as important 
institutional factors51 as well as to the function and locale of economic activities.52
CR, when it is actually implemented and internalized, can also be consid-
ered as an internal institutional arrangement as it changes the expectations of 
those working for the company as well as those interacting with it. Not only is 
CR contributing to the branding and legitimation of the company but it can also 
serve strategic goals, such as risk management and accountability.53 GFAs can 
well serve both of these purposes, i.e., as a signal to the public and as a refer-
ence for workers and management. In this sense, GFAs may change the rules of 
engagement between management and unions.
The most significant external actors here are GUFs. A GUF’s involvement 
brings with it that of its affiliates. Some of these affiliates may represent workers 
in the subsidiary, others may want to organize them and still others may be inter-
ested in broader developments in the sector or the GFA strategy as a whole. The 
GFA and the GUF, therefore, give workers and unions along the company’s pro-
duction and supply networks the right to pass judgment on the company’s prac-
tices anywhere in the world. In short, they reconfigure the boundaries between 
the internal and external networks of the firm.54
Despite increasingly vocal arguments in favor of effective enabling or social 
regulation through supranational organizations, as far as MNCs go, little has 
been accomplished up to now. In contrast, there has been significant devolu-
tion of competition for investment to the subnational level. This is particularly 
evident in the USA where the federal state plays an indirect and/or discreet role 
in attracting capital.55 States, regions and cities have been at the forefront of 
competition for attracting investment. The nature of the incentives varies from 
place to place but in many cases labor liberalization, provision and control are 
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56 Unions are autonomous from the corporation and generally have a range of membership 
that extends beyond a single corporation. As such we have dealt with them in this paper as 
external actors with legitimate internal concerns. Employee organizations, such as works 
councils, are considered internal because they are specific to the corporation and have some 
decision-making power. See Müller-Jentsch 2004.
57 Using our definition of GFAs, we count a total of 85 as of the end of April 2012. While we 
have not analyzed the newer GFAs as we did with the first 73 we have kept abreast of develop-
ments and can state with certainty that there has been no change in the patterns reported.
key selling points. Finally, on the actor side, managers at all levels are key inter-
nal players, as are unions and employee representative bodies – where present.56
4   Bargaining, change and diversity:  
The significance of global-local linkages
4.1  Data and methods
 The data for our four case studies is taken from the larger context of an interdis-
ciplinary and multi-country research project on the motivation for and the imple-
mentation of GFAs. In the project, three criteria were used in selecting MNCs for 
our case study interviews from an original sample of 73 GFAs (2009) to control 
for industry-specific characteristics, regional home/headquarter effects, and the 
global reach of the MNC: (a) The GFA has been signed by one of the four GUFs 
(BWI, ICEM, IMF, UNI) which account for over 90 per cent of all those in existence; 
(b) The MNC is headquartered in Europe (85% of all firms with GFAs), attesting to 
a European style of HRM policies and labor relations at the HQ level; (c) The MNC 
has subsidiaries in Brazil, India, Turkey and the USA.57 These countries are among 
the top ten for direct foreign investment by MNCs with GFAs. Also, their systems 
of labor relations differ markedly and, we would argue, provide a critical test for 
the global standardization of labor relations.
This selection process yielded a group of 22 MNCs with a GFA. For 8 of these 
we currently have primary and secondary source material as well as interview 
data from management and labor, all of which extends from the headquarter to 
the subsidiary level in the four focal countries. Further, text analyses of the inter-
view data together with the texts of 73 GFAs was conducted at headquarters level 
using academic software (Atlas.ti).
The four cases selected for this paper are taken from the completed eight cases 
mentioned above. Each represents a different sector with a different GUF involved. 
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Most importantly, the four GFAs examined include a “hollow” (ResourceCorp), a 
“modifying” (MetalCorp) and two “creative” outputs from the negotiation phase of 
the GFA process (SecureCorp and ChemCorp). Three of these companies share an 
overall good record in terms of the global implementation of their GFA; the fourth 
(ResourceCorp) has been a laggard globally, making its recent policy changes in 
the USA worthy of closer scrutiny. Yet, even the three companies with good records 
differ in terms of their actual implementation practices across the four countries we 
have been researching and their practices are largely consistent with what we would 
expect from the nature of the agreement, i.e., the creative agreements tend to be 
implemented according to the agreement while the modifying one varies depending 
on the strength of local unions. In all four cases there have been noticeable to major 
discrepancies between the commitments of the GFA and practices in the USA.
5  The cases
The four mini-cases are structured in a similar fashion, starting from the most 
“hollow” agreement and ending with the most “creative.” While we provide enough 
information to offer a rounded profile we err in the direction of information that 
best allows us to explore the continuous bargaining processes involving manage-
ment and labor unions at various levels. On the basis of this evidence we argue that 
transnational collaboration amongst unions is a necessary if not sufficient condition 
of success. A second condition that multiplies the impact of transnational collabora-
tion is the degree to which management at the global level is compelled to engage 
unions either as a result of union pressure or because of the value it attaches to the 
GFA. All cases show clearly that host country factors and the mode of presence in the 
USA shape the foundation on which the GFA is implemented. In three cases a conflu-
ence of transnational union collaboration combined with management’s decision to 
honor rather than escape its GFA moved implementation forward. The fourth case 
(MetalCorp) confirms the significance of this confluence. While this company has 
been more responsive in countries where such transnational strategies put pressure 
on the company it has been unresponsive in the USA because key unions along the 
corporation’s production chain could not collaborate.
5.1  ResourceCorp 
ResourceCorp is a medium-sized family owned transnational in the business 
of resource extraction and production of building materials. As indicated by 
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its relatively high number of country locations (approx. 77) in combination 
with the relatively medium-sized number of employees (90,000), it operates a 
highly decentralized production network. Another thirty thousand workers are 
employed by sub-contractors for ResourceCorp. Three characteristics seem to be 
important for understanding ResourceCorp’s business model: the intensive use of 
sub-contracting due to the high flexibility and low set-up costs of its root business 
process in resource extraction, the wide dispersion of its business operations 
including several countries with dubious human rights records, and its strategic 
turn to a management model based on a voluntaristic policy of environmental 
sustainability. According to the company, however, somewhat less than three-
quarters of its employees have union representation and collective agreements.
The initiative for negotiating a GFA was taken by BWI as one of the responsible 
GUFs. Its success was the result of the informal personal channels of communica-
tion forged by the chief BWI negotiator at previous meetings of ResourceCorp’s 
stakeholder council. Despite the prevalence of cooperative labor relations with 
the unions in ResourceCorp’s home country, BWI and ICEM, which had joined 
the negotiations, had to overcome strong management resistance to conclud-
ing a GFA. ResourceCorp management continually harped on the need for the 
agreement to give preference to the host country laws on union recognition and 
collective bargaining over the core labor standards of the ILO. ResourceCorp’s 
management also refused to jeopardize the economic benefits of outsourcing to 
business partners by extending agreed standards to suppliers. Moreover, man-
agement injected the legal argument that the company could not be held respon-
sible for the policies of its subcontractors and suppliers, nor for those of its sub-
sidiaries, which they designated as independent organizational units even where 
ResourceCorp was a majority shareholder.
In the end, it was partly a good personal relationship of one of the GUF 
representatives with the manager in charge of sustainability policy along with 
ResourceCorp’s desire to get additional credibility for its CSR strategy and to keep 
alleged violations of labor standards an internal affair which broke the negotia-
tion deadlock and led to the signing of the GFA in 2005. However, this strategy 
assigns only minor importance to labor-related issues. And indeed, since signing 
the agreement (2005) it has been a laggard in terms of its implementation, justify-
ing the placement of this agreement in the “hollow” category.
ResourceCorp is one of the major players in North America, its third largest 
market, where it has grown via acquisitions. During the last decade it has sought 
to centralize its North American activities and place them more fully under the 
control of global headquarters. This, the company reports, has given it more lev-
erage in sourcing. At the same time, the company has allowed its US subsidiary a 
great deal of independence in dealing with its employees. This fits well to central 
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management’s legal arguments during negotiations and bolstered US manage-
ment’s strong opposition to the GFA.
During 2008 and 2009 ResourceCorp got involved in two contentious issues 
with two different US unions at the local level. In one case the company sought to 
modify the health coverage of its employees while in the other it sought to prevent 
unionization by hiring a union-avoidance specialist. These practices, along with 
a number of other local conflicts, had created a hostile environment. The unions 
involved eventually decided that approaching global HQs about implementing 
the GFA in the US was a promising strategy (despite their misgivings about GFAs 
in general). To that end they organized a North American network to coordinate 
their actions towards this and other companies in the sector. In addition to their 
continental network, they also sought collaboration with global union federa-
tions as well as national European unions. In a concerted effort, they attended 
meetings of the company’s board and asked the secretary-general of one of the 
GUFs to play the role of the key interlocutor with global management. This he 
played out to the hilt, even to the point of threatening withdrawal from the agree-
ment. This, then, was an instance of a transnational union network ensuring that 
local practices were brought to the attention of global management. Ultimately, 
global management overcame national and local resistance and committed to 
implementing the GFA in the USA at least in the foreseeable future. This decision 
was accompanied by an apparent reassignment of personnel at its US operations. 
In addition to the pressure applied by the global union network, it was reported 
to us that the dispute had generated concerns within the company about possible 
negative financial implications.
The company’s letter of commitment to the implementation of the GFA in 
the USA is an incomplete step in the process of implementation. Shortly thereaf-
ter a subsidiary in an important emerging market claimed that the GFA did not 
apply to it. The GUFs involved have expressed their concern about this piecemeal 
approach to the GFA but were reassured that global management is willing to 
include the kind of explicit commitment that they offered in the USA into a rene-
gotiated agreement. If so, this will be an instance of moving in the direction of 
transnationalizing HRM and labor relations in the interest of a comprehensive 
CR strategy.
5.2  MetalCorp 
The second company is a leading automotive company with strong presence in 
North America. It expanded into the USA by purchasing a number of companies 
in the early 1990s. In all cases it accepted the status quo, which included unioni-
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zation by two different unions. It continues to do so to this day, a practice that is 
consistent with the GFA but did not result from its application. In the late 1990s 
MetalCorp purchased a major US company while also building a new greenfield 
plant of its premium division in a southern state. For its part, the union (United 
Auto Workers – UAW) concluded that its recognition at the new greenfield site 
would pose no problems. This expectation received additional impetus from the 
CR initiatives adopted by the CEO (Global Compact) and the subsequent negotia-
tion of a GFA. The global works council, in fact, provided for representation by 
the US and Canadian unions that held the contracts of the purchased company. In 
addition, the national works council and the major home union behind it worked 
out an arrangement whereby a representative of the US union would sit on the 
Supervisory Board of the company. Nevertheless, the company was resolute in 
opposing the meaningful participation of the IMF, making its signature on the 
agreement largely symbolic.
When the UAW and, subsequently, a second union, tried to unionize the 
greenfield site they were met with stiff local resistance at the company and in 
the community. The company disclaimed any anti-union activity on the part of 
its management, stating that it would welcome unionization if that was the pref-
erence of the employees. At the same time it indicated that their HRM practices 
were of such high quality that they saw no practical reason why workers would 
want to unionize. There is no evidence that the company actively opposed unioni-
zation in these cases. Instead, leading figures from the local development board 
strongly expressed their opposition to the company’s position that unionization 
was a possibility, however unlikely and undesirable, and hired union-avoidance 
specialists. While this practice led to a public relations problem for the local 
development board it nevertheless successfully stymied unionization efforts. In a 
similar case at a local supplier to MetalCorp, the company claimed to be taking a 
neutral stance (there is some debate about that) while local interests took the lead 
in preventing unionization.
MetalCorp is highly unionized even outside its home country. In the USA, the 
company accepted the presence of the labor union at those workplaces, which it 
acquired from another company. In these instances, the labor union was a factor 
and an actor in the local labor control regime. MetalCorp’s investment decision 
could not be selective regarding labor relations and had to recognize previously 
existing arrangements. To be sure, after the takeover, MetalCorp management 
could have elected to go non-union. However, it rejected that option, presumably 
because of the problems and conflicts it would have engendered.
In contrast, MetalCorp knowingly selected a location with a decidedly “no 
union” environment for its greenfield investment. While global management 
repeatedly confirmed its willingness to respect the right of the union to run an 
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organizing campaign and as a good “corporate citizen” to abide by the law and 
local customs, it was well aware of the strength of local anti-union sentiment. 
Attempts on the part of the UAW and subsequently the other union, the Inter-
national Association of Machinists, to overcome this opposition failed, not only 
because of local anti-union activities, but also because the unions did not develop 
a transnational leverage strategy that would have included the powerful home 
country union and MetalCorp’s works council. As the organizing drives of the US 
unions remained local exercises, labor’s position of strength within the corpora-
tion’s home country remained unutilized. Global corporate management was not 
under any immediate pressure to make any clarifying statements or ensure that 
local management did in fact respect the corporate policy of neutrality.
Both instances raise important practical and theoretical questions. From a 
practical point of view it can be argued that the company did not live up to its 
GFA obligations by not taking a strong positive attitude towards unionization in 
its own plant and that of the supplier. This contrasts with the company’s much 
better record of using its GFA to resolve disputes involving suppliers throughout 
its production chain as well as its more recent policy explicitly applying the GFA 
to suppliers. It also contrasts with the company’s long-standing relations with 
unions in the rest of its activities throughout the USA.
5.3  SecureCorp 
The third company is in the security sector. The company entered the US 
market in the 2004 by buying a Danish multinational, which had bought a 
large US company, a multinational in its own right, two years earlier. Soon 
thereafter the subsidiary entered into a protracted conflict with a major union, 
which is also a dominant player in the relevant Global Union Federation. The 
national union organized a global campaign that involved the GUF, bilateral 
relations with unions where SecureCorp operates, and union capacity build-
ing in countries where SecureCorp was planning new operations. The high 
costs of a continued conflict, pressure from a global network of unions and 
the company’s strategy to position itself as a global “brand” known for its CR 
in HRM in a sector rife with “bottom feeders” facilitated the resolution of the 
national conflict.
Security services must go where they are contracted (largely in cities) and 
can benefit from a good brand name, especially if they are global players seeking 
contracts involving high risk facilities or the headquarter locations of other glob-
ally operating corporations. As noted, the US union had an aggressive nation-
wide campaign to unionize the sector and supported that campaign through 
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transnational networks and capacity building. At the same time, its end-goal is 
a collaborative arrangement that seeks to ensure that companies that unionize 
remain competitive in their markets. Altogether, there are many reasons why a 
company interested in creating a global brand would be willing to find common 
ground with a major national union that has global reach. Moreover, the company 
sees the global union federation as a partner in ensuring higher levels of labor 
rights around the globe in exchange for a collaborative approach that ensures 
competitiveness. In this particular case, then, it would seem that the company is 
pursuing a transnational policy as far as HRM is concerned.
As with ResourceCorp, a transnational campaign pursued by labor unions 
moved the SecureCorp towards the implementation of the GFA in the USA. One 
important difference, however, is the more proactive and strategic view of the 
GFA by SecureCorp management. After bitter resistance to union recognition 
in the USA, SecureCorp HQ’s management acquiesced, engaging the GUF as a 
global partner in developing a joint implementation policy. Yet, that does not 
mean that the negotiations have ended. During 2011 SecureCorp participated in 
multilateral negotiations in the USA with the key union and two other compa-
nies in the sector (one of them also a GFA signatory) in an effort to ensure that 
implementation does not place it in a disadvantageous position. As was related 
to us by union representatives, the expectation was that SecureCorp would take 
a leading role in the sector by actively supporting implementation. Most recent 
information suggests that some positive developments have taken place that will 
lead to the better implementation of the GFA in the USA. That SecureCorp assigns 
a great deal of importance to the USA is evidenced by the fact that the global 
HR manager, and the one who negotiated the GFA, has now taken over as HR 
manager for the Americas.
5.4  ChemCorp 
The final company is in the chemicals sector and its major presence in the USA is 
through its purchase of a national company which was already unionized. Addi-
tionally, it has a variety of operations in other specialized chemicals. As a result it 
is a company in search of a common identity.
Because employees represented by one of the home unions are significant 
shareholders, they are entitled to elect a representative to the managing board. 
In this case, their representative, a former union official, is now in charge of the 
company’s sustainability program. At the same time the CEO of the company is 
also committed to sustainability and CR. Yet, for some time the company was 
facing some obstacles in adopting the GFA provisions in the USA, despite the fact 
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that many of its plants are unionized and that central HQs was keen on imple-
menting the IFA. Increasingly, however, a confluence of developments seems 
to have overcome any systemic local resistance. This confluence consists of a 
number of developments.
ChemCorp management has taken a very aggressive approach to globalizing 
its CR commitments emerging from the GFA in the direction of global social dia-
logue. Besides annual joint GUF-management missions to subsidiaries in selected 
countries, new forms of intra-company transnational networks have been insti-
tutionalized. This we would argue sets ChemCorp apart from the practices of 
SecureCorp, which are less institutionalized. This is clearly an instance of global 
headquarters pushing subsidiaries in the USA to implement the GFA. While a 
global HRM strategy may also be operating in this case (as the company is trying 
to unify its disparate acquisitions) there also seem to be additional factors associ-
ated with the global governance of the corporation at play. For these reasons, this 
GFA is one of the most “creative” ones.
At the global level the company has developed a close relationship with a 
global union federation that is itself very interested in ensuring its own role in 
negotiating and implementing global agreements. The external actor, in short 
has become an internal one. In collaboration the company and the global union 
federation have set up a global health and safety committee that is now in opera-
tion and are exploring the possibility of setting up a global works council. When 
a major US union with contracts at several important plants tried to organize a 
newly acquired facility and met with resistance from local management, global 
HQ reacted swiftly to protests from the US union and the GUF, ensuring that local 
management would not intervene and that no procedural obstacles to the unioni-
zation process would be raised.
During 2012 ChemCorp was bought by another company in the sector. Its CEO 
will succeed the buyer’s CEO when he retires in a few years. Whether these GFA-
related initiatives survive and get transferred to the new company will be a major 
test of the resilience of best practices.
6  Findings and implications
The bargaining model advanced by Levy and Prakash is designed to show the 
complexity of interests with which MNCs must deal in pursuing their preferred 
governance goals. The authors conclude from this that MNC “support or opposi-
tion for a particular regime type” will be determined by “MNCs’ perceptions of 
their relative influence versus other actors across governance arenas as well as 
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the competitive implications of specific regimes.”58 Secondly, the authors argue 
that the multi-actor and “dynamic nature of the bargaining process” results 
in an “indeterminacy of outcomes.” Thus, “while MNCs are powerful actors, 
they do not always succeed in imposing their preferred regime type.” Using this 
bargaining model we have been able to examine the impacts of internal and 
external actors operating within global and local institutional arrangements 
with particular attention to their impact on local labor control regimes. In what 
follows we outline the constellations of actors that best explain the outcomes 
that we observe and, on that basis, draw some general conclusions from the 
findings.
At ResourceCorp we found a corporate policy of outsourcing and delegating 
responsibility for employment and labor relations to local actors. Combined with 
a hollow GFA the way was opened for management representatives in one sub-
national locality to attempt to weaken the recognized union and in another to 
block union recognition efforts. National host country union activity linked to the 
global union federations BWI and ICEM generated pressure that was applied to 
corporate headquarters, which in turn issued a policy guideline on neutrality and 
collective bargaining that national and subnational management was obliged to 
follow. Bargaining over union demands was restarted and local management 
remained neutral in a recognition election that the union won. How stable local 
labor-management relations are over time is uncertain. At this point, however, we 
have an actor constellation in support of implementing the GFA that is driven by 
transnational union collaboration and facilitated by global management’s deci-
sion to make national management implement the GFA.
At SecureCorp, investment in the USA took place before the GFA was signed 
and came via acquisition of an operation with an openly anti-union policy. 
SecureCorp headquarters had good relations with its home country union, but 
left decisions on labor relations to local management in the USA. The national 
union, which was external to the corporation as it held no contracts, concluded 
that it could only gain recognition through an aggressive public campaign and 
transnational union cooperation. Working with the relevant GUF (UNI) and affili-
ates in other countries with SecureCorp subsidiaries, the national union turned a 
national campaign into a global one, which in the end brought SecureCorp corpo-
rate headquarters to the bargaining table to negotiate a GFA. The GFA is a creative 
one because it establishes and institutionalizes joint consultations and imple-
mentation. After the signing of the GFA, partial recognition of the union has been 
achieved and collective bargaining has commenced. Again, the actor constella-
tion that produced these results involved transnational union collaboration and 
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a global management that decided to honor its commitments and force national 
management to comply with them. Interestingly, in this case, the national union’s 
willingness to help the corporation remain competitive while also running a 
worldwide campaign in collaboration with the GUF seems to have played an 
important role for a global management intent on branding the corporation.
ChemCorp has invested in the US through acquisitions. In some subnational 
labor markets unions were already established while, in others, unions had not 
been able to organize ChemCorp operations. National unions ran into stiff oppo-
sition on the part of national ChemCorp management. The union reported this 
problem to the GUF (ICEM), which embarked on a joint mission to the USA with 
global management in order to bring US management into line with corporate 
policy as expressed in its GFA. This example of a creative agreement involving a 
joint GUF-headquarter management approach enabled the national union to run 
an organizing campaign and win a recognition election. In this case we found an 
actor constellation driven by the joint activity of the global external and internal 
actors, but also with strong input from the national union. The role of national 
management has been more reactive than proactive, meaning that the long-term 
implementation of the GFA is still hanging in the balance, especially since Chem-
Corp has been acquired by a company that has not signed a global agreement.
MetalCorp’s investments in the USA are a good example of the adaptation of 
an MNC to specific local labor control regimes in conjunction with its investment 
goal of gaining and increasing its market shares in the US. The first investments 
in production sites were through acquisitions of operations some with union 
contracts. With a more recent greenfield investment, a location was chosen with 
a dominant anti-union culture, although MetalCorp has a long history of stable 
relations with the home country union and has a GFA that is strongly anchored 
at headquarters and has been used to rectify reported violations outside the 
USA. MetalCorp accepted the union as an actor in the local labor market at the 
acquired sites. In contrast, at the greenfield site, local management has declared 
itself neutral in line with official corporate policy, but has used MetalCorp’s 
strong position in the local labor market based on attractive employment condi-
tions and its integrated position in the local business community to undermine 
union organizing efforts. Until recently, the unions in both the host and the home 
countries did little to leverage this situation by developing transnational links 
together with the GUF (IMF). As a result, the actor constellation was fragmented: 
national and subnational local management determined employment conditions 
and silenced union voice, global external (GUF) and internal (World Employee 
Committee) actors on the labor side were not consulted or recruited for develop-
ing a common strategy, and global management could reference the GFA without 
having to involve itself locally or discipline local management.
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From these cases we summarize that GFA implementation depends on the 
strength of the overarching actor constellation. Implementation is most success-
ful when all four actor groups: local internal, local external, global internal and 
global external cooperate in realizing the agreement. Where such coalitions of 
cooperative partners do not develop, local management has the leeway to deter-
mine labor relations policies. However, what our cases also show is that when 
global external actors, such as GUFs, are successful in leveraging the GFA with 
global management, then local management acquiesces, at the very least. In the 
MetalCorp case neither of these two constellations were present.
The three successful cases support the possibility that MNCs do not 
always get to hold onto the advantages they reaped when making policy 
without union involvement; but also, that in certain situations they may be 
adaptable to accepting constructive labor relations with unions if necessary. 
Transnational labor collaboration in conjunction with the successful leverag-
ing of the GFA at the level of global management helped move these GFAs 
away from the host country dynamics. This finding is consistent with Cooke’s 
argument59 that transnational union collaboration can help shift the balance 
of power in favor of labor unions, especially in a country like the USA. Trans-
national union collaboration, he suggests, raises the costs of intransigence on 
the part of management by expanding the scale and scope of management-
union engagement. One of the advantages that corporations enjoy is that 
they can engage in global strategies against entities, whether states, locali-
ties or unions that employ local strategies. Transnational union collaboration 
tempers this uneven bargaining relationship. This is consistent with the logic 
of Keck and Sikkink’s argument60 regarding the potential of local-global-local 
“boomerang” effects.
The significant additional finding here is that the implementation of the 
GFA required both transnational union collaboration and a successful engage-
ment of management by employing the “institution” of the GFA. Our explanation, 
therefore, involves a confluence of actor preferences as well as an institutional 
element. Our broader research suggests that at this constitutional moment in time 
most GFA signatories have sooner or later responded to transnational collabora-
tion that involved GUFs while they were less likely to do so when the pressures 
were more fragmented and did not involve the use of a GFA. Evidence for this can 
be seen in a dramatic case involving IKEA in the USA, where transnational union 
collaboration and use of the GFA allowed a national union to organize a plant in 
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Virginia. In contrast, a local campaign involving the same company in the same 
town during the same time failed dismally.61 
The fact that a number of GFAs have been implemented in the USA does not 
mean that they are all the same. What becomes apparent is that the micro-insti-
tutional arrangements that emerge, i.e., the specific GFAs, reflect the bargaining 
amongst actors that starts with negotiations and continues with implementation 
and beyond. Some of these GFAs reflect more proactive attempts at global social 
dialogue, others are instances of HRM based global branding and still others may 
be examples of assertive unilateral CR policies.
Another intriguing lesson from our study relates to the preferred levels of 
authority. Levy and Prakash suggest that MNCs prefer enabling regimes at the 
global level and social regulatory regimes at the national level. In general this 
confirms insights by others that MNCs do not treat all functions equally. Strategic 
functions are more likely to attract the resources of HQs while less strategic func-
tions are likely to be marginalized and fragmented.62 What the GFAs show, and 
this is not inconsistent with the deeper logic of the Levy and Prakash argument 
and the literature on forum-shifting, is that choices regarding levels of authority 
are strategic. In this case MNCs prefer to keep GFAs at the global level to avoid 
the costs of implementation and to absorb the CR benefits. GUFs, on the other 
hand, want GFAs implemented at the local level because it is here that enforce-
able agreements can be reached through collective bargaining, thus institutional-
izing the process and moving in the direction of social regulation. One presumes 
that as the bargaining over GFAs unfolds the various actors involved will continue 
to promote those levels of authority that are more consistent with the kinds of 
policy that they want.
7  Conclusions: CR, MNCs and Nation-States
The puzzle animating this article is rooted in the exceptions we have found to the 
influence of USA liberal capitalism on European signatories of GFAs. The fact that 
these are exceptions that deviate from the norm demonstrates the influence of 
national institutions on the implementation of CR initiatives. A growing corrective 
to the aggregate national level of much of comparative institutionalism has been the 
emphasis on subnational and local institutional arrangements.63 Such an approach 
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is necessary for large, federal countries and consistent with the approach to trans-
national politics associated with global production networks.64 However, it serves 
better as a corrective as most subnational dynamics are engendered by and nested 
within broader national rules and institutions. The heterogeneity of US industrial 
relations in the private sector is particularly apparent in the MetalCorp case.
As we have shown, GFAs involve a category of actors, GUFs and their member 
affiliates from different countries, that has not received much attention in the litera-
ture.65 A GUF’s mandate to negotiate and sign a GFA comes indirectly from employees 
via its member unions. GUFs are weak organizations, both in terms of rule making 
and resources. However, they occupy a nodal point that brings together organiza-
tions from practically every corner of the world. To the degree that their affiliates 
allow them a modicum of autonomy they can exercise a leadership in regard to 
MNCs and their labor policies that is unrivaled among civil society organizations.
Managers at the global, national and local level are key internal actors, their 
relations shifting depending on the nature of the cross-border strategy of the cor-
poration.66 While we have only been able to touch briefly on their roles in the 
GFA implementation process, both the bargaining model and the case studies 
should have made it clear that GFAs, much more than unilateral codes of conduct 
and almost all multi-stakeholder arrangements, have an actually substantial 
impact on the internal managerial relations of the corporation. On one hand, they 
empower HQs to pursue a global labor strategy while, on the other, they require 
national and local managers to craft local labor strategies that reflect local insti-
tutions but are also consistent with the GFA.
GFAs are not simply goals to be reached in this case. They are also strategic 
tools that are employed by transnational union networks for institutionalizing 
global labor relations. GFAs present us with an important case because they are 
negotiated with labor unions, autonomous organizations that represent MNC 
workers. This distinguishes them from entities such as NGOs that advocate for 
workers.67 As a result their attention to the firm’s activities is more sustained. 
Moreover, as our cases suggest, unions can scale up their bargaining activity 
to the global level while “shadowing” the firm from the plant to the HQs. When 
unions can collaborate, and important elements of management are committed 
to the GFA the end result is a global form of governance within which local imple-
mentation is enacted.
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But what do GFAs, as an emergent institution, herald? With respect to the 
corporation they are more likely to promote global rather than multi domestic or 
transnational labor practices. GFAs commit MNCs to ensure that their subsidia-
ries and their suppliers adopt policies that are based on global standards while 
remaining sensitive to local circumstances. To the degree that transnational labor 
collaboration is successful it raises the salience and visibility of labor practices 
on the MNC agenda. As a result, GFAs globalize both CR and the MNC.
But does that mean that GFAs are evidence of a new global regulatory labor 
regime? That is not necessarily the case. As our case studies show, even success-
ful implementation of individual GFAs does not automatically mean the emer-
gence of a broader institution of negotiated civic regulation.68 Unless a majority 
of leading firms in each sector has negotiated and implemented similar GFAs, 
a move beyond national labor relations systems and towards a more patterned 
global regime is unlikely. Nevertheless, the micro-institutional beginnings of 
individual GFAs could well pave the way for a meso-institutional global regime.
However, in the absence of global public rules, it is very possible that a patch-
work of social regulatory regimes at the level of individual firms may emerge. 
This possibility would be embedding GFAs within CR more so than embedding CR 
within emerging forms of civic or public regulation or industrial relations. Such 
an outcome may well be considered business-enabling to the degree that it limits 
the pressure on the MNC to be consistent with globally established labor rules 
and fails to come to terms with the precariousness of employment relationships 
at the periphery of global production networks.
There is no evidence that binding global public policy with respect to labor 
practices is on the horizon. An adequate global public policy would have to 
ensure that firms and global production networks are covered, i.e., that firms 
have responsibility for those they “govern” even in countries with low labor 
standards. It is conceivable that the source of such policy would be the ILO, but 
its role would have to be strengthened and its standards better integrated into a 
comprehensive global social policy. Yet, while GFAs, by themselves, leave a great 
deal to be desired, their experience can serve to identify best practices in this 
continuous bargaining that involves negotiation, implementation, monitoring, 
evaluation and renegotiation. Ideally, such a process can inform a global public 
policy tailored to a world in which MNCs play a central if not dominant role. 
However, unless GUFs and transnational union collaboration can ensure that the 
content and implementation of GFAs is not mired in a contradictory patchwork, 
individual best practices will not necessarily amount to collective best practices.
68 Bendell 2000.
Bereitgestellt von | Freie Universität Berlin
Angemeldet | 87.77.118.212
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.14 13:27
 Bargaining for corporate responsibility      27
References
Almond, P. 2011. “The sub-national embeddedness of international HRM.” Human Relations 
64(4): 531–551.
Bartlett, C. and S. Ghoshal. 1998. Managing across borders: the transnational solution. 2nd ed. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Bendell, J. ed. 2000. Terms of endearment: business, NGOs and sustainable development. 
Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishers.
Birkinshaw, J. and T. Pedersen. 2009. Strategy and management in MNE subsidiaries. In:  
A. Rugman (ed.), The Oxford handbook of international business. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 367–388.
Block, F. and M. Keller. eds. 2011. State of innovation: the U.S. Government’s role in technology 
development. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press.
BNA – Bureau of National Affairs. 2011. EBI Workers at Ikea Supplier in VirginiaVote Against 
Steelworkers Representation, 25 LRW 1490 (August 18, 2011).
Brown, D., A. Vetterlein and A. Roemer-Mahler. 2010. “Theorizing transnational corporations as 
social actors: an analysis of corporate motivations.” Business and Politics 12(1), 1–37.
BWI (Building and Woodworkers International). 2011. Danville, Virginia. Swedwood Workers 
Vote Union YES. URL: http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?Index = 3639&Language = EN 
(Accessed August 1, 2011).
Campbell, J. L. 2004. Institutional change and globalization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Campbell, J. L. 2007. “Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? An institutional 
theory of corporate social responsibility.” Academy of Management Review 32(3): 946–967.
Cobb, J. and W. Stueck. eds. 2005. Globalization and the American South. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press.
Cooke, W. N. 2001. “Union avoidance and foreign direct investment in the USA.” Employee 
Relations 23(6): 558–580.
Cooke, W. N. 2003. “The influence of industrial relations system factors on foreign direct 
investment.” In: W. Cooke (ed.), Multinational companies and global human resource 
strategies, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, pp. 65–85.
Cooke, W. N. 2005. “Exercising power in a prisoner’s dilemma: transnational collective bargaining 
in an era of corporate globalisation?” Industrial Relations Journal 36(4): 283–302.
Cooke, W. N. 2008. Multinational companies and global human resource strategy. Oxford 
handbooks online: The Oxford handbook of human resource management, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 489–508.
Crouch, C., M. Schroder and H. Voelzkow. 2009. “Regional and sectoral varieties of capitalism.” 
Economy and Society 38(4): 654–678.
Croucher, R. and E. Cotton. 2009. Global unions, global business. global union federations and 
international business. Middlessex: Middlessex University Press.
Davies, S., G. Williams and N. Hammer. 2011. “Organizing networks and alliances: international 
unionism between the local and the global.” In: K. Papadakis (ed.), Shaping global 
industrial relations. the impact of international framework agreements. Geneva:ILO; 
Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 201–219.
Deeg, R. and G. Jackson. 2007. “Towards a more dynamic theory of capitalist variety.” Socio-
Economic Review 5(1): 149–179.
Bereitgestellt von | Freie Universität Berlin
Angemeldet | 87.77.118.212
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.14 13:27
28      Michael Fichter et al.
Descolonges, M. 2009. La protection du maillon le plus faible. Enjeux de l’action syndicale au 
sein de la sous-traitance et des fournisseurs des multinationales. Les usages des accords-
cadres internationaux. Etude pour la CGT. IRES-CGT. Paris.
Dicken, P. 2011. Global shift: Mapping the changing contours of the world economy. 6th ed. 
New York: The Guilford Press.
Edwards, Paul et al. 2007. Employment practices of MNCs in organizational context: a large-scale 
survey. De Montfort University; Kings College London; Warwick Business School. Warwick; 
London.
Egels-Zandén, N. 2009. “TNC motives for signing international framework agreements: a continuous 
bargaining model of stakeholder pressure.” Journal of Business Ethics 84(4): 529–547.
Fichter, M. 2011. “Exporting labor relations across the Atlantic? Insights on labor relations 
policies of German corporations in the U.S.” Working USA 14(2): 129–143.
Fichter, M. and J. Sydow. 2002. “Using networks towards global labor standards? Organizing 
social responsibility in global production chains.” Industrielle Beziehungen – The German 
Journal of Industrial Relations 9(4): 357–380.
Fichter, M. and M. Helfen. 2011. “Going local with global policies: implementing international 
framework agreements in Brazil and the United States.” In: K. Papadakis (ed.), Shaping 
Global industrial relations. the impact of international framework agreements. Geneva: 
ILO and Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 73–97.
Fichter, M., M. Helfen and J. Sydow. 2011a. “Employment relations in global production networks –  
Initiating transfer of practices via union Involvement.” Human Relations 64(4): 599–622.
Fichter, M., M. Helfen and J. Sydow. 2011b. “Regulating labor relations in global production 
networks. Insights on international framework agreements.” Internationale Politik und 
Gesellschaft (2): 69–86.
Fransen, L. W. and A. Kolk. 2007. “Global rule-setting for business: a critical analysis of multi-
stakeholder standards.” Organization 14(5): 667–684.
Gartenberg, I. and S. Bandekar. 2011. “Challenges to ensuring core labour standards in 
transnational corporations: the case of India.” The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 
54(2): 269–283.
Geppert, M., D. Matten and P. Walgenbach. 2006. “Transnational institution building and the 
multinational corporation: An emerging field of research.” Human Relations 59(11): 1451–1465.
Geppert, M. and K. Williams. 2006. “Global, national and local practices in multinational 
corporations: towards a sociopolitical framework.” International Journal of Human 
Resources Management 17(1): 49–69.
Gregoratti, C. and D. Miller. 2011. “International framework agreements for workers’ rights? 
Insights from River Rich Cambodia.” Global Labour Journal 2(2): 84–105.
Griffin, J. and A. Prakash. 2010. “Corporate responsibility: Initiatives and mechanisms.” 
Business and Society 49(1): 179–184.
Hall, P. and D. Soskice. eds. 2001. Varieties of capitalism: the institutional foundations of 
comparative advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herrnstadt, O. 2007. “Are international framework agreements a path to corporate social 
responsibility?” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business and Employment Law 10(1): 
187–224.
Hoffman, C. 2008. “Global campaigns: a case study with G4S.” International Union Rights 
15(3): 4–5.
HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2010. A strange case: violations of workers’ freedom of association in 
the United States by European multinational corporations. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Bereitgestellt von | Freie Universität Berlin
Angemeldet | 87.77.118.212
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.14 13:27
 Bargaining for corporate responsibility      29
Hyman, R. 2004. “Is industrial relations theory always ethnocentric?” In: B. Kaufman (ed.), 
Theoretical perspectives on work and the employment relationship. Champaign: Industrial 
Relations Research Association, pp. 265–292.
International Organization of Employers. 2007. International framework agreements: an 
employers’ guide. Geneva: IOE.
ITC-ILO [International Training Center – International Labour Organization]. 2010. Key issues 
for management to consider with regard to Transnational Company Agreements (TCAs): 
Lessons learned from a series of workshops with and for management representatives. 
Turin: ITC-ILO.
Jackson, G. and R. Deeg. 2008. “From comparing capitalism to the politics of institutional 
change.” Review of International Political Economy 15(4): 680–709.
Jonas, A. E. G. 1996. “Local labour control regimes: Uneven development and the social 
regulation of production.” Regional Studies 30(4): 323–338.
Keck, M. and K. Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international 
politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kostova, T. 1999. “Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: a contextual 
perspective.” The Academy of Management Review 24(2): 308–324.
Kostova, T. and K. Roth. 2002. “Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations: Institutional and relational effects.” Academy of Management 
Journal 45(1): 215–233.
Kytle, B. and J. G. Ruggie. 2005. Corporate social responsibility as risk management. Corporate 
Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper #10. URL: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/
CSRI/publications/workingpaper_10_kytle_ruggie.pdf (Accessed April 20, 2012).
Lane, C. and G. Wood. 2009. “Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism.” Economy and 
Society 38(4): 531–551.
Levy, D. and A. Prakash. 2003. “Bargains old and new: multinational corporations in global 
governance.” Business and Politics 5(2), 131–150.
Logue, J. 1980. Toward a theory of trade union internationalism. Gothenburg: University of 
Gothenburg Press.
Macaire, S. 2001. “New Economic Regulations Law Adopted.” Eironline. URL: http://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2001/05/feature/fr0105156f.htm (Accessed July 22, 2011).
McCallum, J. K. 2011. “Trade union renewal and labor transnationalism in South Africa: The case 
of SATAWU.” Working USA 14(2): 161–176.
Matten, D. and J. Moon. 2008. “‘Implicit’ and ‘Explicit’ CSR. A conceptual framework for a 
comparative understanding of corporate social responsibility.” Academy of Management 
Review 33(2): 404–424.
Morgan, G. and P. H. Kristensen. 2006. “The contested space of multinationals: Varieties of 
institutionalism, varieties of capitalism.” Human Relations 59(1): 1467–1490.
Müller-Jentsch, W. 2004. “Theoretical approaches to industrial relations.” In: B. Kaufman 
(ed.), Theoretical perspectives on work and the employment relationship. Champaign, IL: 
Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 1–40.
Niforou, C. 2012. “International framework agreements and industrial relations governance: 
global rhetoric versus local realities.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 50(2):  
352–373.
Northrup, H. and R. Rowan. 1979. Multinational collective bargaining attempts: the record, the 
cases and the prospects. Multinational Relations Series 6. Philadelphia, PA: Industrial 
Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Bereitgestellt von | Freie Universität Berlin
Angemeldet | 87.77.118.212
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.14 13:27
30      Michael Fichter et al.
Papadakis, K. ed. 2011. Shaping global industrial relations. the impact of international 
framework agreements. Geneva: International Labour Office and Houndsmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Platzer, H.-W. and T. Müller. 2011. Global and European trade union federations. a handbook 
and analysis of transnational trade union organizations and policies. Trade Unions Past, 
Present and Future 14. Oxford: Peter Lang.
Preuss, L., A. Haunschild and D. Matten. 2009. “The rise of CSR: Implications for HRM and 
employee representation.” International Journal of Human Resource Management 20(4): 
953–973.
Pudelko, M. and A.-W. Harzing. 2007. “Country-of-origin, localization, or dominance effect? 
An empirical investigation of HRM practices in foreign subsidiaries.” Human Resource 
Management 46(4): 535–559.
Rainnie, A. l., A. Herod and S. McGrath-Champ. 2011. Review and positions: global production 
networks and labour. Competition and Change 15(2): 155–169.
Riisgaard, L. and N. Hammer. 2011. “Prospects for labour in global value chains: Labour 
standards in the cut flower and banana industries.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 
49(1): 168–190.
Robinson, P. K. 2011. “International framework agreements: do workers benefit in a global 
banana supply chain?” In: K. Papadakis (ed.), Shaping global industrial relations. the 
impact of international framework agreements. Geneva: International Labour Office and 
Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 164–178.
Seidman, G. W. 2005. “Monitoring multinationals: corporate codes of conduct.” In: J. Bandy 
and J. Smith (eds.), Coalitions across borders. Transnational protest and the neoliberal 
order. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 163–183.
Stevis, D. 1998. “International labor organizations, 1864–1997: The weight of history and the 
challenges of the present.” Journal of World-Systems Research 4: 52–75. http://jwsr.ucr.
edu/.
Stevis, D. 2009. International framework agreements and global social dialogue: Lessons  
from the Daimler case. Employment working paper, 46 (Geneva, International Labour 
Office).
Stevis, D. 2010. International framework agreements and global social dialogue: Parameters 
and prospects, Employment working paper, 47 (Geneva, International Labour Office).
Stevis, D. 2011. “The impacts of international framework agreements: lessons from the 
Daimler case.” In: K. Papadakis (ed.), Shaping global industrial relations. the impact 
of international framework agreements. Geneva: International Labour Office and 
Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 116–142.
Stevis, D. and T. Boswell. 2007. “International framework agreements: opportunities and 
challenges for global unionism.” In: K. Bronfenbrenner (ed.), Global unions: challenging 
transnational capital through cross-border campaigns. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press/ILR, pp. 174–194.
Stevis, D. and T. Boswell. 2008. Globalization and labor: democratizing global governance. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Streeck, W. 2009. Re-Forming capitalism. Institutional change in the German political economy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tempel, A. and P. Walgenbach. 2007. “Global standardization of organizational forms and 
management practices? What new institutionalism and the business-systems approach 
can learn from each other.” Journal of Management Studies 44(1): 1–24.
Bereitgestellt von | Freie Universität Berlin
Angemeldet | 87.77.118.212
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.14 13:27
 Bargaining for corporate responsibility      31
Thelen, K. 2009. “Institutional change in advanced political economies.” British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 47(3): 471–498.
Waddock, S. 2008. “Building a new institutional infrastructure for corporate responsibility.” 
Academy of Management Perspectives 22(3): 87–108.
Walton, R. E., J. Cutcher-Gershenfeld and R. B. McKersie. 2000. Strategic negotiations: a theory 
of change in labor-management relations. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Wills, J. 2002. “Bargaining for the space to organize in the global economy: a review of the 
Accor-IUF trade union rights agreement.” Review of International Political Economy 9(4): 
675–700.
Bereitgestellt von | Freie Universität Berlin
Angemeldet | 87.77.118.212
Heruntergeladen am | 18.06.14 13:27
